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Abstract
Employing a two-period overlapping generations model of R&D-based
growth with both product development and process innovation, this paper
examines how a subsidy policy for encouraging more individuals to receive
higher education aects the per capita GDP growth rate of the economy. We
show that when the market structure adjusts partially in the short run, the
eect of an education subsidy on economic growth is ambiguous and de-
pends on the values of the parameters. However, when the market structure
adjusts fully in the long run, the education subsidy expands the number of
firms but reduces economic growth. These unfavorable predictions for the
education subsidy on economic growth are partly consistent with empirical
findings that mass higher education does not necessarily lead to higher eco-
nomic growth. A higher education subsidy policy is perhaps inappropriate
for the purpose of stimulating long-run economic growth.
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1 Introduction
It is believed by many policy makers that a large, highly educated workforce is
key to national prosperity, and the expansion of the higher education sector is an
important driver of economic growth. For example, the policy documents pro-
duced in support of the UK 2011 education financing reforms stated that “Higher
education is important to growth through equipping individuals with skills that
enhance their productivity in the workplace, promoting the economy’s knowledge
base and deriving innovations”(BIS, 2011; p.21). In fact, most developed coun-
tries have been providing a set of subsidy policies aimed at broadening the access
to higher education, especially for the poor, and encouraging more individuals to
receive higher education.1 These policies include the public provision of low-cost
tertiary institutions, means tested grants, loan and work study programs, tax cred-
its and so on. Figure 1 shows the share of public and private funding of tertiary
educational institutions in OECD countries (OECD, 2016; Table B3.1b, p218).
On average, across OECD countries, nearly 70% of all funds for tertiary educa-
tional institutions comes directly from public sources, while the share of public
and private funding varies widely across countries.
However, there was strikingly little evidence to support the causal eects of
the quantity measures of higher education (e.g., tertiary enrollment rate, average
years of tertiary schooling, and the share of workers that complete tertiary edu-
cation) on economic growth. In their survey on education and economic growth,
Krueger and Lindahl (2001) find that “education [is] statistically significantly and
positively associated with subsequent growth only for countries with the lowest
level of education.” Hanushek (2016) shows that once the quality measure of pre-
tertiary education as measured by international mathematics and science tests at
earlier ages is taken into account, school attainment per se is unrelated to eco-
nomic growth, implying that adding years of university provide no greater im-
pact than added years of earlier schooling.2 Moreover, a recent survey study by
Holmes (2013) concludes that “neither the increase nor the initial level of higher
education is found to have a statistically significant relationship with growth rates
both in the OECD and world wide.” These empirical findings indicate that a mass
higher education does not necessarily lead to higher economic growth.
1State intervention for the market of higher education is justified because higher education cre-
ates external benefits in terms of tax dividends, economic growth, social cohesion and parenting.
State intervention for the finance of higher education is justified for incomplete capital markets.
However, since students receive significant private benefits from their degrees, the costs of higher
education should be shared, that is, there should be taxpayer subsidies but also tuition fees. See,
chapter 12 of Barr (2012) for more details of the optimal design of the higher education system.
2Hanushek (2016) also notes that part of this lack of impact of attainment of higher education
is probably because there are no good measures of university quality; thus, very dierent outcomes
are treated the same.
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Motivated by these gaps between what is asserted in the political debates and
the available evidence, this paper examines theoretically how a subsidy policy for
encouraging more individuals to receive higher education aects the per capita
GDP growth rate of the economy. Because technological progress via R&D inno-
vation has been identified as the primary driving force of modern economic growth
(e.g., Romer 1990), we are particularly interested in the eect of a higher educa-
tion subsidy policy on R&D-based innovations. This paper develops a two-period
overlapping generations (OLG) model of R&D-based growth where skilled labor
inputs matter for both product development and process innovation, and skilled
labor supply is endogenously determined according to the individuals’ choice of
higher education. In line with the literature of the second-generation R&D-based
growth model, pioneered by Peretto (1998), Howitt (1999), and Segestrom (2000),
the model features two dimensions of technological progress. In the vertical di-
mension, incumbent production firms invest in process innovation with the ob-
jective of lowering production costs. In the horizontal dimension, the product
development sector creates new product designs for firms entering the production
sector. In this Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous market structure
measured by the equilibrium number of firms, we examine how a subsidy policy
for encouraging more individuals to receive higher education aects the per capita
GDP growth rate of the economy. Then, we show that when the market structure
adjusts partially in the short run, the eect of the education subsidy on economic
growth is ambiguous and depends on the values of the parameters. However, when
the market structure adjusts fully in the long run, the education subsidy expands
the number of firms but reduces economic growth. A higher education subsidy
policy is perhaps inappropriate for the purpose of stimulating long-run economic
growth.
The intuition behind this result is explained as follows. The higher rate of
education subsidy increases the supply of skilled labor, lowers the employment
costs of researchers, and increases incentives for both product development and
process innovation, which positively aect the per capita GDP growth rate in the
short run. In the long run, however, the product development encourages the entry
of new production firms, which in turn reduces the market size of each production
firm. Given that the market size of a production firm determines its incentives
for process innovation, the higher rate of an education subsidy decreases long-
run economic growth.3 These unfavorable predictions of an education subsidy
on economic growth are partly consistent with the empirical findings that mass
higher education does not necessarily lead to higher economic growth.
3Laincz and Peretto (2006) provide empirical evidence for a positive relationship between the
average firm size and economic growth. See also Ha and Howitt (2007), Madsen (2008), Madsen,
Ang, and Banerjee (2010), and Ang and Madsen (2011) for other empirical studies that support
the second-generation R&D-based growth model.
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This paper is related to several branches of the literature. First, this paper is
related to the literature on endogenous growth theories, which described human
capital as the engine of growth through innovations (e.g., Aghion and Howitt,
1992; Grossman and Helpman; 1991; Romer, 1990). In particular, this paper is
closely related to previous works that analyze the eects of the skill composition
of the labor force on the amount of innovation in the economy (e.g., Grossman
and Helpman; 1991; Vandenbusshe et al., 2006). Using their seminal model of
a variety expansion, Grossman and Helpman (1991) show that an increase in the
stock of skilled labor can be growth enhancing, while an increase in the stock of
unskilled labor can be growth-depressing.4 Vandenbusshe et al.(2006) develop a
model of technology catch up and show that skilled labor has a higher growth-
enhancing eect closer to the technological frontier under the assumption that in-
novation is a relatively more skill-intensive activity than producing imitations.5 In
contrast to these studies, this paper considers the case where the skill composition
of the labor force is determined endogenously through the individuals’ choice of
higher education. This specification enables us to analyze the interactions among
higher education subsidies, the skill composition of the labor force, and economic
growth more extensively.
Second, this paper is closely related to a few pioneering theoretical studies that
analyze the eects of publicly provided education targeted to high-ability work-
ers on R&D-based growth (e.g., Grossman, 2007; Bo¨hm et al., 2015). Grossman
(2007) incorporates an occupational choice framework into an in-house process
innovation-based growth model and shows that publicly provided education aimed
at expanding the science and engineering skills of high-ability workers is unam-
biguously growth promoting and neutral with respect to the earnings distribution.
Bo¨hm et al.(2015) develop a numerical simulation model of directed technical
change and show that publicly provided education aimed at expanding the skills
of high-ability workers eventually trickles down to low-ability workers and serves
them better than redistribution through labor income taxation or education policies
targeted to the low-ability workers.
Although we share numerous research interests with these studies, our re-
search diers from them in the following respects. First, to examine the eects
of the skill composition of the labor force on both the vertical and horizontal di-
mensions of technological progress, we employ a Schumpeterian growth model
with an endogenous market structure, where both growth in product variety and
4See the third section of their chapter 5.
5Using a panel data set covering 19 OECD countries between 1960 and 2000, Vandenbusshe
et al.(2006) find a link between the five-year growth rates and higher education, once distance
from the technological frontier is controlled for. However, Hanushek (2016) shows that the point
estimate on the interaction of cognitive skills and OECD countries is slightly negative, which
indicates that the skills are less important in developed countries.
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product quality are determined endogenously through R&D investment. This ex-
tension enables us to obtain richer theoretical implications regarding the eects of
the skill composition of the labor force on R&D-based growth. To the best of our
knowledge, the existing Schumpeterian growth literature has yet to analyze this
issue rigorously. Second, we focus on the analysis of a higher education subsidy
policy aimed at expanding the number of individuals who receive higher educa-
tion, whereas existing studies focus on the analysis of a public education policy
aimed at improving the skills of high-ability workers. Roughly speaking, this
paper focuses on the eects of the size of the higher education sector, while exist-
ing studies focus on the eects the quality of the higher education sector. These
dierences in modeling strategy enable us to reveal dierent aspects of a higher
education promoting policy that have yet to be examined in the literature. In this
sense, our research complements the analyses conducted by Grossman (2007) and
Bo¨hm et al.(2015).
Third, this paper is closely related to Chen (2015), which shows the somewhat
counterintuitive negative eects of educational subsidies on economic growth. In
his Diamond (1965)-type OLG model with endogenous fertility and skill acquisi-
tion, increases in educational subsidies will hamper economic growth due to the
following three reasons. First, a higher income tax rate will lower the motivation
to become skilled workers; second, the increased time spent on education and
raising children will result in less time being available for working; and third, an
increase in the average fertility rate will give rise to a capital-dilution eect, ulti-
mately reducing the capital per worker. In contrast to Chen (2015), our analysis
is based on a model that considers R&D-based innovations as the fundamental
driver of economic growth. Therefore, this paper proposes an alternative theoreti-
cal mechanism that explains the long-run negative eects of educational subsidies
on economic growth.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model. Sec-
tion 3 investigates the dynamic equilibrium properties of the economy. Section 4
examines the eect of a higher education subsidy on economic growth. Section 5
concludes the paper.
2 Model
This section introduces a two-period OLG model of R&D-based growth with en-
dogenous skill acquisition, productivity growth and variety expansion.6 The econ-
6Some basic settings in our model are inherited from Tanaka and Iwaisako (2011), where the
skilled labor supply is determined endogenously according to the individuals’ choice of higher
education, i.e., unskilled labor is assumed to only engage in the production activities, while skilled
labor is assumed to be able to engage in the both the R&D and production activities.
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omy consists of three sectors: a final goods sector, an intermediate goods sector,
and a product development sector. The final goods sector produces homogeneous
goods for sales in a perfectly competitive market, with a variety of imperfectly
substitutable intermediate goods as inputs. The intermediate goods sector, on the
other hand, consists of monopolistically competitive firms that produce dieren-
tiated product varieties for firms in the final goods sector, with both unskilled and
skilled labors as inputs. Productivity growth arises as a result of process innova-
tion undertaken by the intermediate goods firms, with the objective of lowering
production costs, with solely skilled labor as an input. The product development
sector creates new product designs for firms entering the intermediate goods sec-
tor, with solely skilled labor as an input.
2.1 Individuals
Individuals in this economy live for two periods, young and old. They work only
in their young period and retire in the old period. In each period, young individuals
who are the continuum of measure M are born with one unit of available time
endowment.
In the young period, before entering the labor market, each individual chooses
whether to receive a higher education. Although individuals with higher education
can supply skilled labor in their young period, they must devote min f1 ; 1g units
of time to education according to their known ability . For each individual, this
 is a random variable drawn from a distribution defined over [0; 1] with cumula-
tive distribution function , which is assumed to be continuously dierentiable,
strictly increasing, with a time-invariant function, and common to all individu-
als. Each individual is endowed with  before birth and takes the value as given.
Therefore, higher educated individuals with ability  can supply only max f; 0g
units of skilled labor. On the other hand, individuals who receive only a lesser
education can supply one unit of unskilled labor. For simplicity, we assume that
no other cost is needed for education. In fact, on average, across OECD countries,
foregone earnings for a man attaining a tertiary education is US $ 43,700, whereas
their direct costs are US $10,500 (OECD, 2016; Table B7.3b, p150). The main
costs of a tertiary education are foregone earnings.
Consequently, the before-tax labor income of individuals with ability  who
become skilled workers is given by wst , whereas that of individuals who become
unskilled workers is given by wut , where w
s
t and w
u
t are the wage per unit of skilled
and unskilled labor at period t, respectively. Explicit consideration of the costs
for acquiring basic skills to be an unskilled worker does not alter the main im-
plications of this paper. To maintain the tractability of our model, we omit the
description regarding the individuals’ choice of basic education.
Moreover, higher educated individuals can obtain an education subsidy from
6
the government. To reduce the individual’s opportunity costs of acquiring skills,
the government levies a tax t on the labor income of all young individuals and
subsidizes a fraction s 2 (0; 1) of (1   t)wut for units of time that skilled indi-
viduals devote to acquiring skills 1   . Note that for individuals with ability ,
the opportunity costs of acquiring skills are given by (1   t)wut (1   ) (i.e., the
foregone unskilled labor income during education).
Most developed countries provide a set of policies aimed at improving the
individuals’ accessibility to higher education. These policies include the pub-
lic provision of low-cost tertiary institutions, means tested grants, loan and work
study programs, tax credits and so on. Broadly speaking, these policies can be
interpreted as higher education subsidy policies aimed at reducing the student’s
opportunity costs of acquiring skills.
Under such a subsidy policy, the after-tax income of individuals with ability 
who become skilled workers is given by (1 t)[wst + swut (1  )], whereas that of
individuals who become unskilled workers is given by (1 t)wut . Therefore, given
the definition of !t  w
u
t
wst
, the condition under which an individual with ability 
obtains a higher education is described by:
  (1   s)!t
1   s!t  !ˆ(!t; s): (1)
Therefore, as long as !t  1, the relations !ˆ!(!t; s) > 0 and !ˆs(!t; s) < 0 hold,
which indicates that the skilled worker share decreases with the relative wage of
unskilled/skilled workers !t, whereas it increases with the education subsidy rate
s.
Exploiting the law of large numbers, we can compute the skilled and the un-
skilled labor supply as follows:
H(!t; s) 
Z 1
!ˆ(!t;s)
Md(); (2)
L(!t; s) 
Z !ˆ(!t;s)
0
Md(): (3)
Therefore, as long as !t  1, as shown in Appendix A, we can confirm that the
relations H!(!t; s) < 0, Hs(!t; s) > 0, L!(!t; s) > 0 and Ls(!t; s) < 0 hold.
These results indicate that the skilled labor supply (resp., unskilled labor supply)
decreases (resp., increases) with the relative wage of unskilled/skilled workers !t,
whereas it increases (resp., decreases) with the education subsidy rate s.
The lifetime utility of individuals with ability , born in period t, is expressed
as follows:
Ut = lnC

1;t + lnC

2;t+1;  2 (0; 1); (4)
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where C1;t and C

2;t+1 represent their consumption during their youth and old age,
respectively.
The budget constraints of these individuals are expressed as follows:
Pc;tC1;t + S

t = (1   t)max

wst  + sw
u
t (1   ) ;wut
	
; (5)
Pc;t+1C2;t+1 = Rt+1S

t ; (6)
where S t is their saving during their youth, and Pc;t and Pc;t+1 are the price of final
goods at period t and t + 1, respectively.
By maximizing (4) subject to (5) and (6), we obtain the following:
S t =

1 + 
(1   t)max wst  + swut (1   ) ;wut 	 : (7)
2.2 Final goods sector
The final goods sector is perfectly competitive. We assume that one representative
final goods firm combines nt kinds of intermediate goods to produce the final good
Yt in period t. Following Benassy (1996) and others, we specify the technology of
final goods production as follows:
Yt = n
+1   1
t
 Z nt
0
xt( j)
 1
 d j
! 
( 1)
;  > 1; (8)
where xt( j) is the jth intermediate good input. The parameter  captures the
degree of specialization in production. The elasticity of substitution between any
two of the intermediate goods is equal to . If  = 1=(   1), (8) reduces to a
well-known Dixit-Stiglitz-type specification.
Given the price of the final good Pc;t and those of the intermediate goods pt( j),
the firm maximizes its profit. Because of the perfect competition, the final goods
firm earns zero profit, that is, Pc;tYt =
R nt
0
pt( j)xt( j)d j. Since the production func-
tion is in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the first-order conditions for the
profit maximization and the zero-profit condition yield the well-known following
demand functions:
xt( j) =
pt( j) R nt
0
pt( j)1 d j
PtYt; 8 j 2 [0; nt]; (9)
where Pt = n
1
 1 
t
R nt
0
pt( j)1 d j
1=(1 )
is a price index of the intermediate goods.
Here, note that the relation Pc;t = Pt holds due to the zero-profit condition.
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2.3 Intermediate goods sector
Each intermediate good j is produced by monopolistically competitive firms that
hold a blueprint for the intermediate good j. Each firm has the following constant-
returns-to-scale production technology:
xt( j) = At( j)

lst ( j)
 lut ( j)1  ;  2 (0; 1); (10)
where lst ( j) and l
u
t ( j) represent the skilled and unskilled labor inputs of firm j at
period t, whereas xt( j) and At( j) are the output and productivity of firm j at period
t, respectively. Let At  1nt (
R nt
0
At( j)d j) denote the average productivity of firms in
period t.
Intermediate good firms invest in process innovation with the aim of lowering
the production cost through productivity improvements. A firm with its R&D
department employs lRt ( j) units of skilled labor in process innovation. Based on
Grossman (2007, 2009), the firm-level productivity At( j) evolves according to:
At( j) = zAt 1[lRt ( j)]
; z > 0;  > 0; (11)
The term At 1 captures the public technological knowledge at period t, which ac-
cumulates within firms as a byproduct of process innovation. We adopt the level
of the average productivity of firms in period t   1 as a proxy for the stock of
public technological knowledge at period t. Following the process innovation
framework employed by Peretto and Conolly (2007) and others, we model knowl-
edge spillovers into process innovations among firms as a function of the average
productivity of technological knowledge observable by the R&D departments of
firms. 7 Each intermediate goods firm maximizes its net profit, t( j). The profit
maximization problem of intermediate goods firm j is as follows:
t( j)  max
n
pt( j)xt( j)   wst lst ( j)   wut lut ( j)   wst lRt ( j)
o
; (12)
subject to (9), (10) and (11).8 By solving the problem, we obtain the optimal labor
input as follows:
lst =

wst
   1

PtYt
nt
; (13)
7An alternative formulation is that firms have to incur in-house R&D expenditure one period
in advance of production, similar to in the discrete time infinite-horizon model of Young (1998).
However, this assumption seems to be less plausible in an OLG model.
8In our model, as in Peretto and Conolly (2007), the productivity of the in-house R&D invest-
ment in period t fully depends on the level of public knowledge in period t, At 1. In addition, it is
assumed that the in-house R&D investment in period t can aect the level of productivity in pe-
riod t, At(i) instantaneously. Due to these assumptions, the intermediate goods firm’s market value
maximization problem can be formulated as its net profit maximization problem each period. With
noting (13), the market value of the jth intermediate goods firm is given by Vt( j) =
P1
=1
t+( j)
i=i=1Rt+i
.
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lut =
1   
wut
   1

PtYt
nt
; (14)
lRt =

wst
   1

PtYt
nt
: (15)
The derivations of (13) to (15) are provided in Appendix B. Hereafter, we as-
sume (   1) < 1 to satisfy the second-order condition for maximization. Using
equations (12) to (15), we obtain the following maximum net profits for each in-
termediate firm in period t:
t =
1   (   1)

PtYt
nt
: (16)
Because of the ex ante homogeneity of the individuals, all intermediate goods
firms behave in the same way. Thus, we omit index j whenever this does not lead
to confusion.
2.4 Product development sector
The invention of new variety requires skilled labor as its only private input. Be-
tween periods t and t + 1, competitive R&D firms in the product development
sector employ LNt eciency units of skilled labor as researchers, develop nt+1   nt
new blueprints, and sell these blueprints to intermediate goods firms at their mar-
ket values of Vt. Thus, given a research productivity of t, output is expressed as
follows:
nt+1   nt = tLNt : (17)
Following Jones (1995), research productivity is a given for each firm but de-
pends on the aggregate level, positively on the number of existing ideas (i.e., the
standing-on-shoulders eect), as follows:
t = ¯n
 
t ; ¯ > 0;  2 [0; 1): (18)
The specification  2 [0; 1) implies that the marginal eect of nt on t is decreas-
ing with nt. The standing-on-shoulders eect arises because the creation of a new
product designed adds to the existing stock of public knowledge related to product
design, improving the labor productivity of future product development.
Under the assumption of free entry in the product development sector, the
expected gain of VttLNt from R&D must not exceed the cost of w
s
t L
N
t for a finite
size of R&D activities at equilibrium. Thus, we have the following conditions:
Vtt
8>><>>:= wst , then LNt > 0; nt+1 > nt;< wst , then LNt = 0; nt+1 = nt: (19)
10
We next consider no-arbitrage conditions. The market value of intermediate
goods firms Vt (i.e., the market value of blueprints) is related to the risk-free inter-
est rate Rt. Shareholders of intermediate goods firms that purchased these shares
during period t obtain dividends of t+1 during period t+1 and can sell these shares
to the subsequent generation at a value of Vt+1. In the financial market, the total
returns from holding the stock of a particular intermediate firm must be equal to
the returns on the risk-free asset Rt+1Vt, which implies the following no-arbitrage
condition:
Rt+1 =
t+1 + Vt+1
Vt
: (20)
2.5 Government
The government levies a tax t on the labor income of all young individuals and
subsidizes a fraction s 2 (0; 1) of (1 t)wut for units of time that skilled individuals
devote to acquiring skills 1 . Thus, its budget constraint of period t is as follows:
t[wstH(!t; s) + w
u
t L(!t; s)] = (1   t)wut
Z 1
!ˆ(!t;s)
s(1   )Md(); (21)
where the left-hand side is the total tax revenue raised from all young individuals
and the right-hand side is the total expenditure composed of education subsidy
payments to all skilled young individuals.
2.6 Market-clearing conditions
Now, we consider the labor market conditions. Skilled labor is demanded by
both intermediate goods firms and product development firms to produce inter-
mediate goods, to conduct process innovation and to invent new products, while
unskilled labor is demanded only by intermediate goods firms to produce interme-
diate goods. Thus, the market-clearing conditions for both skilled and unskilled
laborers are described as follows:
nt(lst + l
R
t ) + L
N
t = H(!t; s); (22)
ntlut = L(!t; s): (23)
Furthermore, as shown in Appendix C, we can obtain the following asset mar-
ket equilibrium condition:Z 1
0
S t Md()
8>><>>:= nt+1Vt; for nt+1 > nt;= ntVt; for nt+1 = nt: (24)
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This condition states that the savings of young individuals in period t must be
used for investing in new inventions (Vt(nt+1   nt)) or purchasing existing stocks
that were owned by preceding generations (Vtnt). In particular, when the product
development sector does not operate (i.e., nt+1 = nt), the savings of young indi-
viduals in period t must be devoted to purchasing existing stocks that were owned
by preceding generations (Vtnt).
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the dynamics of the relative wages of unskilled/skilled
workers, the average productivity of firms, the number of firms, and the value of
GDP.
3.1 Relative wage of unskilled/skilled workers
In this subsection, we describe the determination of the relative wage of un-
skilled/skilled workers. We first consider the case where the product development
sector operates (i.e., nt+1 > nt). When the product development sector operates
(i.e., nt+1 > nt), from (7), (21) and (24), we can obtain the following equation:
nt+1Vt =

1 + 
[wstH(!t; s) + w
u
t L(!t; s)]: (25)
By substituting (17) and (19) into (25), equation (25) can be rewritten as follows:
nt
t
=

1 + 
[H(!t; s) + !tL(!t; s)]   LNt : (26)
By using equations (13) to (15) and equations (22) to (25), as shown in Appendix
D, we can express the skilled labor engaged in the product development sector LNt
as follows:
LNt = H(!t; s)  
 + 
1   !tL(!t; s): (27)
Thus, by substituting (18) and (27) into (26), we can obtain the following equa-
tion:
n1  t
¯
=
 

1 + 
+
 + 
1   
!
!tL(!t; s)   11 + H(!t; s): (28)
From (28), we can see that the relative wages of unskilled/skilled workers !t
depend on the number of firms nt and the education subsidy rate s (i.e., !t =
!(nt; s)). Appendix D shows that!(nt; s) satisfies the following properties: !n(nt; s) >
0 and !s(nt; s) > 0.
12
Next, we consider the case where the product development sector does not
operate (i.e., nt+1 = nt). When the product development sector does not operate
(i.e., nt+1 = nt), from (27) and LNt = 0, we can obtain the following equation:
1   
 + 
=
!tL(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
  (!t; s): (29)
From (29), we can see that the relative wages of unskilled/skilled workers !t are
given by the constant value, which is denoted as !, and depends upon the educa-
tion subsidy rate s (i.e., ! = !(s)). Appendix D also shows that !(s) satisfies
the following property: !s(s) > 0.
From (28) and (29), we denote the number of firms nt such that it satisfies
!(nt; s) = !(s) as n(s). As shown in the following subsection 3-3, we can con-
firm that n(s) satisfies the following property: ns(s) > 0. From (27), when the
product development sector operates (i.e., nt+1 > nt), since LNt > 0, the follow-
ing inequality 1 
+
> !tL(!t;s)H(!t;s)   (!t; s) holds. From (29) and  !(!t; s) > 0, this
inequality implies that the relation !(nt; s) < !(s) holds in the case where the
product development sector operates (i.e., nt+1 > nt). With noting !n(nt; s) > 0
from (28), these results imply that the product development sector operates (i.e.,
nt+1 > nt) if and only if the number of firms nt is suciently small to satisfy
nt < n(s). In contrast, suppose that nt  n(s) (i.e., nt+1 = nt) and the product de-
velopment sector does not operate; thus, the entry of new firms never occurs. Tak-
ing these results into account, the equilibrium relative wage of unskilled/skilled
workers !t is given by the following expression:
!t =
8>><>>:!(nt; s); for nt < n(s);!(s); for nt  n(s): (30)
The solid line in Figure 2 describes the relationship between the number of
firms nt and the equilibrium relative wages of unskilled/skilled workers !t. Since
!n(nt; s) > 0, the relative wages of unskilled/skilled workers increases with the
number of firms nt in the region where nt < n(s), but it remains constant at
!(s) when nt  n(s). Moreover, since !s(nt; s) > 0 and !s(s) > 0, as shown
in the upward shift of the !(nt; s) and !(s) curves in Figure 2 (i.e., s < s0),
given the value of nt, the higher rate of education subsidies positively aects the
relative wages of unskilled/skilled workers. The higher rate of education subsidy
s increases the supply of skilled workers, which lowers their relative wages.
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3.2 Dynamics of the average productivity of firms
In this subsection, we analyze the dynamics of the average productivity of firms.
By substituting (14) and (23) into (15), we can obtain the following equation:
lRt =

1   
!tL(!t; s)
nt
: (31)
Then, using (28) and (29), the skilled labor engaged in process innovation lRt in
(31) can be expressed as follows:
lRt =
8>>>>><>>>>>:

1 
"
1
¯n t
+ 11+
Hˆ(nt ;s)
nt
#

1++
+
1 
; for nt < n;

+
Hˆ(s)
nt
; for nt  n;
(32)
where
Hˆ(nt; s)  H (!(nt; s); s) ;
Hˆ(s)  H (!(s); s) :
From (32), we can see that the skilled labor engaged in process innovation lRt de-
pends upon the number of firms nt and the education subsidy rate s (i.e., lR(nt; s)).
Appendix E shows that the relations Hˆn(nt; s) < 0, Hˆs(nt; s) > 0 and Hˆs (s) > 0
hold. These results imply that lR(nt; s) satisfies the following properties: lRn (nt; s) <
0 and lRs (nt; s) > 0. Since !n(nt; s) > 0 and L!(!t; s) > 0, equation (31) sug-
gests that the number of firms nt has two competing impacts upon the level of
lRt . A larger number of firms nt decreases each firm’s market size, which nega-
tively aects the level of lRt , whereas it increases the values of !tL(!t; s), which
positively aects the level of lRt .
9 The results obtained from (32) indicate that
the former negative eect always dominates the latter positive eect because the
relation lRn (nt; s) < 0 holds. Moreover, since l
R
s (nt; s) > 0, the higher rate of ed-
ucation subsidy s positively aects the level of skilled labor engaged in process
innovation.
Using (11) and (32), the gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms
is given by the following expression:
GAt 
At
At 1
= z
h
lR(nt; s)
i  GA(nt; s): (33)
9As in Peretto and Connolly (2007), the quality-adjusted gross firm size is measured by the
quality-adjusted volume of production, xtAt . Using (28), (A.12), (A.31) and cˆt =
(wst )
(wut )
(1 )
(1 )(1 ) , we
obtain xtAt = (

1  )
 1
!1 t
1
t
+
H(!t ;s)
1+

1++
+
1 
. Thus, with noting (18) and (30), we can easily confirm that a
larger number of firms nt decreases each firm’s market size.
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From (32) and (33), we can easily confirm that GA(nt; s) satisfies the following
properties: GAn (nt; s) < 0 and G
A
s (nt; s) > 0.
The solid line in Figure 3 describes the relationship between the number of
firms nt and the equilibrium gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms
GAt . Since G
A
n (nt; s) < 0, the gross growth rate of the average productivity of
firms decreases with the number of firms. As the number of firms nt increases,
each firm’s market size decreases, which motivates firms to invest less in process
innovation and thereby lowers the gross growth rate of the average productivity
of firms GAt . Moreover, since G
A
s (nt; s) > 0, as shown in the upward shift of the
GA(nt; s) curve in Figure 3 (i.e., s < s0), given the value of nt, the higher rate
of education subsidy s positively aects the equilibrium gross growth rate of the
average productivity of firms. The higher rate of education subsidy s increases
the supply of skilled workers, lowers their relative wages, increases each firm’s
incentives for process innovation by reducing the employment costs of researchers
and, thus, positively aects the gross growth rate of the average productivity of
firms.
3.3 Dynamics of the number of firms
In this subsection, we describe the dynamics of the number of firms. When the
product development sector operates (i.e., nt+1 > nt), from (19) and (25), we can
obtain the following equation:
nt+1
t
=

1 + 
[H(!t; s) + !tL(!t; s)] : (34)
Then, by using equations (26) to (29) and (34), the gross growth rate of the number
of firms can be expressed as follows:
Gnt+1 
nt+1
nt
=
8>><>>: 1F(nt;s)  Gn(nt; s); for nt < n(s);1; for nt  n(s): (35)
where
F (nt; s)  F

 ˆ(nt; s)

= 1   1 + 

1   +1   ˆ(nt; s)
1 +  ˆ(nt; s)
;
 ˆ(nt; s)    (! (nt; s) ; s) = !(nt; s)Lˆ (nt; s)
Hˆ (nt; s)
;
Lˆ (nt; s)  L (! (nt; s) ; s) :
As shown in Appendix F,Gn(nt; s) satisfies the following properties: Gnn(nt; s) < 0
and Gns(nt; s) > 0.
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The solid line in Figure 4 describes the relationship between the number of
firms nt and the gross growth rate of the number of firmsGnt+1. SinceG
n
n(nt; s) < 0,
the gross growth rate of the number of firms Gnt+1 decreases with the number of
firms nt. To avoid an unnecessary lexicographic explanation, as shown in Figures
2 and 4, we restrict our analyses to the case where the initial number of firms
n0 is suciently small to ensure the relations !0 = !n(n0; s) < !(s) and Gn1 =
Gn(n0; s) > 1 hold. Under such assumptions, equation (35) shows that given
the initial value of n0, nt gradually approaches its steady-state value, denoted as
n(s). On the transition path, the number of firms determines each firm’s market
size and the equilibrium gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms
GAt according to (33). When nt evolves toward its steady-state value n
(s), as
described in Figure 3, GAt also gradually approaches its steady-state value G
A(s),
which is defined by GA(s)  GA(n(s); s).
More precisely, from (35), the dynamics of nt are determined by the following
one-dimensional dierence equation:
nt+1 =
8>><>>:Gn(nt; s)nt; for nt < n(s);nt; for nt  n(s):
As shown in Appendix G, the dierentiation of Gn(nt; s)nt with respect to nt
around the steady state nt = n yields the following:
dnt+1
dnt
jnt=n= 1   (1 + )(1    )
 + 
 +  + (1 + )
1+!
(s)L!(!(s);s)
Lˆ(s)
1+!
(s)L!(!(s);s)
Lˆ(s)
 !(s)H!(!(s);s)
Hˆ(s)
< 1;
where Lˆ(s)  Lˆ (!(s); s). Therefore, suppose that the stepping-on-shoulders pa-
rameter  is suciently large to satisfy the following:

1 + 
0BBBBBB@1   1 +  +  1 +
!(s)L!(!(s);s)
Lˆ(s)
1 + !
(s)L!(!(s);s)
Lˆ(s)
  !(s)H!(!(s);s)
Hˆ(s)
1CCCCCCA   ; (36)
We can ensure that the relation dnt+1dnt jnt=n2 [0; 1) holds. Otherwise, we can see
that the relation dnt+1dnt jnt=n< 0 holds.
The solid lines in Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the possible dynamics of nt when
the parameter conditions of (36) are satisfied and not satisfied, respectively. As
shown in Figure 5, when the parameter conditions of (36) are satisfied, the dy-
namics of nt are stable and nt gradually converges to a unique positive steady-state
value n(s). However, when the parameter conditions of (36) are not satisfied, as
shown in Figure 6, nt does not necessarily converge to a unique steady-state value
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n(s). Instead, the steady-state value of nt depends upon its initial values of n0 and
may become larger than the value of n(s).
In the following analyses, for simplicity, we restrict our analysis to the case
where the parameter conditions of (36) are satisfied. Suppose that the elasticity of
skilled labor input  is suciently small; then, the left-hand side of (36) becomes
negative. In this case, the parameter conditions of (36) hold, irrespective of the
values of  . Moreover, the numerical simulation analyses in the following section
show that equation (36) holds under a wide plausible set of parameter values. The
following proposition summarizes the results and derives the steady-state valuesn
n(s);GA(s)
o
.
Proposition 1 Given the initial value of n0 such that it satisfies !0 = !n(n0; s) <
!(s), if the parameter conditions of (36) hold, the dynamics of nt are stable and
nt gradually converges to a unique positive steady-state value. The steady-state
values
n
n(s);GA(s)
o
are given by the following:
n(s) =
 

1 + 
1 + 
 + 
¯
! 1
1  h
Hˆ(s)
i 1
1  
; (37)
GA(s) = z
h
lR(s)
i
; (38)
where
lR(s)  
 + 
Hˆ(s)
n(s)
=

 + 
h
Hˆ(s)
i   1  

1+
1+
+
¯
 1
1  
:
Proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix G. From (37) and (38), since Hˆs (s) >
0, we can see that the relations ns(s) > 0 and G
A
s (s)  0 hold. The higher rate
of education subsidy s increases the steady-state number of firms n(s), whereas
it decreases the steady-state gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms
GA(s). The intuitive mechanism behind the results of proposition 1 are explained
carefully in the following Section 4.
3.4 The value of GDP
In this subsection, we describe the equilibrium value of GDP. In the R&D-based
growth model, the value of GDP is not necessarily equivalent to that of Yt.10 The
correct value of GDP is defined as follows:
10Gross domestic income (GDI) is calculated by
GDIt =
(1   t)
R 1
!ˆ(!t ;s)

wst  + sw
u
t (1   )

Md() + (1   t)wut L(!t; s) + tnt
Pc;t
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GDPt =
8>><>>:Yt + VtPc;t (nt+1   nt) ; for nt < n;Yt; for nt  n: (39)
Appendix I shows that GDPt in (39) can be rewritten as follows:
GDPt = (1   )1 Atnt t: (40)
where
t 
8>>><>>>:
 1

Hˆ(nt;s)
!(nt;s)1 
+
1 (+)  1
1 
!(nt;s)Lˆ(nt;s)
!(nt;s)1 
 (nt; s); for nt < n;
1
1 
!(s)Lˆ(s)
!(s)1   (s); for nt  n:
Equation (40) indicates that the value of GDP depends upon the average produc-
tivity of firms At, the number of firms nt, and the other market factors t. In
particular, the term t captures the degree of static eciency of production given
the existing technologies and factor inputs. Appendix H shows that the relation
s(s) < 0 holds, which indicates that the education subsidy policy deteriorates the
steady-state static eciency of production.
From (40), the gross growth rate of GDP is given by the following expression:
GGDPt 
GDPt
GDPt 1
=
At
At 1
 
nt
nt 1
!
t
t 1
= GAt
 
Gnt
Gt : (41)
From (41), we can see that the gross growth rate of GDP depends on the gross
growth rate of the average productivity of firms GAt , the number of firms G
n
t , and
the other market factorsGt . The productivity growth rate is based on both the pro-
duction eciency improvement and variety expansion, and the degree of special-
ization parameter  determines the relative importance of the variety expansion
on productivity growth.
From (16) and (21), we have
GDIt =
wst [H(!t; s) + !tL(!t; s)]
Pc;t
+

1   (   1)

Yt:
Further, from (A.14) and (A.15), we obtain
H(!t; s) + !tL(!t; s) = (1 + )
   1

Pc;tYt
wst
+ LNt :
By combining the above two equations, with noting (17) and (19), GDIt is given as follows:
GDIt = Yt +
Vt
Pc;t
(nt+1   nt) :
Therefore, we can confirm that the value of GDI is equivalent to that of GDP.
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In the steady-state equilibrium where the relations nt = nt 1 = n and t =
t 1 = (s) hold, the gross growth rate of GDP becomes equivalent to the gross
growth rate of the average productivity of firms, as follows:
GGDP  GGDPt jnt=n= GA(s): (42)
Since GAs (s)  0 from (38), we can easily confirm that the steady-state gross
growth rate of GDP decreases with the education subsidy rate s.
4 Education subsidy policy
In this section, we summarize the implications of both the short-run and long-run
eects of the education subsidy on the number of firms, the gross growth rate of
the average productivity of firms, and economic growth.
4.1 Eects of the education subsidy on the number of firms and
the gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms
First, we consider the eects of the education subsidy on the number of firms.
Since Gns(nt; s) > 0 from (35), as described in the upward shift of the G
n(nt; s)
curve in Figure 4 (i.e., s < s0), the initial impact of a higher rate of the education
subsidy on the gross growth rate of the number of firms Gnt+1 is positive. Given
the value of nt, the higher rate of education subsidy s increases the supply of
skilled workers, lowers the relative wage of them, enhances the entry of new firms
by reducing the employment costs of researchers and, thus, increases the gross
growth rate of the number of firms for some periods. However, as the number of
firms increases, the gross growth rate of the number of firms decreases steadily,
and the equilibrium number of firms gradually converges to its new steady value.
Since ns(s) > 0 from (37), as described in Figure 5, the number of firms attained in
the new steady state equilibrium becomes larger than that attained in the original
steady-state equilibrium (i.e., ns(s) < n

s(s
0)). These results are summarized in the
following Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The higher rate of the education subsidy enhances the entry of new
firms, increases the gross growth rate of the number of firms for some periods and
increases the steady-state number of firms.
Next, we consider the eect of the education subsidy on the gross growth rate
of the average productivity of firms. SinceGAs (nt; s) > 0 from (33), as described in
the upward shift of the GA(nt; s) curve in Figure 3 (i.e., s < s0), the initial impact
of a higher rate of the education subsidy on the gross growth rate of the average
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productivity of firms GAt is positive. Given the value of nt, the higher rate of
education subsidy s increases the supply of skilled workers, lowers their relative
wages, increases each firm’s incentives for process innovation by reducing the
employment costs of researchers and, thus, positively aects the gross growth rate
of the average productivity of firms. We denote this positive eect of the education
subsidy on the gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms as the “cost
reduction eect”. In the long run, however, market structure is endogenous, and
the number of firms adjusts. The increased supply of skilled workers enhances the
entry of new firms, which in turn reduces each firm’s market size and decreases
incentives for process innovation. We denote this negative eect of the education
subsidy on the gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms as the “entry
eect”. Since GAs (s)  0 from (38), as described in Figure 3, this negative “entry
eect” dominates the positive “cost reduction eect” in the long run (i.e.,GA(s) >
GA(s0)). Therefore, allowing for the endogeneity of the market structure, we can
find the opposite short-run and long-run predictions with regard to the eects of
the education subsidy on the gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms.
These results are summarized in the following Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The initial eect of a higher rate of the education subsidy on the
gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms is positive as a result of an
increased supply of skilled workers. However, in the long run, the increased sup-
ply of skilled workers enhances the entry of new firms and reduces the market size
of each firm. The smaller market size decreases incentives for process innovation
and decreases the steady-state gross growth rate of the average productivity of
firms.
Figures 7-1 to 7-4 show the numerical examples of the transition path of the
relative wage of unskilled/skilled workers !t (Figure 7-1), the number of firms
nt (Figure 7-2), the net growth rate of the number of firms gnt (Figure 7-3) and
the net growth rate of the average productivity of firms gAt (Figure 7-4), when
the education subsidy rate in period 5 and subsequent periods is increased from
0 to 0:3 (i.e., st = 0:3 for all periods t  5). In the simulation, for simplicity,
we assume that the economy is initially in the steady-state equilibrium where the
education subsidy rate s is given by zero (i.e., st = 0 for all period t < 5). In
addition, the ability  is assumed to be distributed uniformly over the interval
[0; 1]. Under such an assumption, the skilled and unskilled labor supply is given
by H(!t; s) = M2
h
1   !ˆ(!t; s)2
i
and L(!t; s) = M!ˆ(!t; s). The parameters used in
the baseline simulations are given in footnote 11, and its explanation is provided
in Appendix I. 11 Note that the objective of these numerical examples is not to
11 = (0:98)30,  = 6,  = 1=(   1),  = 0:3,  = 0:15, z = 2:177,  = 0:35, ¯ = 1, M = 1,
s = 0, A0 = 1, n1 = 0:1.
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calibrate our simple model to actual data but to supplement the qualitative results.
The quantitative results obtained in this paper should be interpreted with caution.
As shown in Figures 7-1 to 7-4, the introduction of the education subsidy pol-
icy in period 5 increases the relative wages of unskilled/skilled workers in period
5 (Figure 7-1), enhances the entry of new firms in period 6 (Figure 7-2), increases
the net growth rate of the number of firms in period 6 (Figure 7-3) and increases
the net growth rate of the average productivity of firms in period 5 (Figure 7-4).
However, as the number of firms increases, the net growth rate of the number of
firms starts to decline from period 7 (Figure 7-3), and the equilibrium number of
firms gradually converges to its new steady-state value, which is larger than that in
the original steady-state equilibrium (Figure 7-2). Therefore, the education sub-
sidy policy expands the equilibrium number of firms. Moreover, since the negative
“entry eect” dominates the positive “cost reduction eect” in the long run, the
net growth rate of the average productivity of firms starts to decline from period
6, and it gradually converges to its new steady-state value, which is lower than
that in the original steady-state equilibrium (Figure 7-4). Therefore, the education
subsidy policy positively aects the net growth rate of the average productivity of
firms in the short run, but it negatively aects the net growth rate of the average
productivity of firms in the long run.
The education subsidy policy encourages more firms to enter the market with
new products, which strengthens horizontal competition among firms. It is this
strengthening of horizontal competition that gives rise to the negative “entry ef-
fect” of the education subsidy on the gross growth rate of the average productivity
of firms. In our model, the relative magnitude of the entry and cost reduction
eects depends on the specifications of the research productivity in the product
development sector. In this study, we have followed Jones (1995) to assume that
the research productivity in the product development sector t depends positively
on the number of existing ideas nt, but the marginal eect of nt on t is decreas-
ing with nt (i.e.,  2 [0; 1)). Equations (37) and (38) indicate that this param-
eter specification plays a crucial role in deriving the results of ns(s) > 0 and
GAs (s)  0. Suppose that we consider an alternative specification of  = 1; then,
our model will generate the counter factual scale eect prediction of economic
growth. Therefore, we find the parameter specification  2 [0; 1) to be a more
reasonable specification.
4.2 Eects of the education subsidy on economic growth
In this subsection, we consider the eect of the education subsidy on economic
growth. Equation (41) shows that the gross growth rate of GDP depends on the
gross growth rate of the average productivity of firmsGAt , the number of firmsG
n
t ,
and the other market factorsGt . However, it is dicult to examine analytically all
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the dynamic properties of the other market factor t and the value of GDP GGDPt .
Therefore, in this subsection, we only show numerical examples of them.
As in Figures 7-1 to 7-4, Figure 7-5 and Figure 7-6 show the numerical exam-
ple of the transition path of the other market factors t (Figure 7-5) and the net
growth rate of GDP gGDPt (Figure 7-6), when the education subsidy rate s in period
5 and subsequent periods are increased from 0 to 0:3. The solid line in Figure 7-6
shows the transition path of gGDPt when the degree of specialization parameter 
is set to  = 1=(   1) to match the Dixit-Stiglitz type specification, whereas the
dashed line in Figure 7-6 shows the transition path of gGDPt when the degree of
specialization parameter  is set to 0. Suppose that  = 0, and the productivity
growth rate is solely based on the production eciency improvement. Peretto and
Conolly (2007) provide a theoretical justification that a production eciency (or
quality) improvement is the only plausible engine of economic growth in the long
run.
The introduction of the education subsidy policy in period 5 deteriorates the
static eciency of production in period 5, which leads to the lower level of the
other market factors in period 5 (Figure 7-5). The evolutions of gAt in Figure 7-4
andt in Figure 7-5 indicate that the education subsidy policy in period 5 provides
two competing impacts upon the net growth rate of GDP in period 5 (Figure 7-
6). On the one hand, as shown in Figure 7-4, the rise in the net growth rate of
the average productivity of firms in period 5 positively aects the net growth rate
of GDP in period 5. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 7-5, the decline in
the level of the other market factors in period 5 negatively aects the net growth
rate of GDP in period 5. In our baseline simulation, since the latter negative
eect dominates the former positive eect, the net growth rate of GDP in period
5 becomes lower than that in the original steady-state equilibrium. The sensitivity
analyses indicate that this prediction holds for a wide range of plausible parameter
values that satisfy both (36) and (   1) < 1.
However, as shown in Figure 7-2 and 7-3, the number of firms starts to in-
crease from period 6, which increases the net growth rate of the number of firms
in period 6. Therefore, if the degree of specialization parameter  is suciently
large, as described in the solid line in Figure 7-6, the net growth rate of GDP in
period 6 becomes higher than that in the original steady-state equilibrium. How-
ever, if the degree of specialization parameter  is suciently small, as described
in the dashed line in Figure 7-6, the net growth rate of GDP in period 6 becomes
lower than that in the original steady-state equilibrium.12 These results imply
that the short-run eect of the education subsidy on economic growth is gener-
ally ambiguous and depends on the values of the parameters. Suppose that the
12The net growth rate of GDP in period 6 becomes higher than that in period 5 irrespective of
the values of  because the negative growth eect of the decline in t occurs only in period 5.
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degree of specialization parameter  is suciently large; then, the education sub-
sidy may positively aect the net growth rate of GDP in the short run. However,
suppose that the degree of specialization parameter  is suciently small; then,
the short-run eect of education subsidy on economic growth is negative. Since
it is dicult to obtain a reliable estimate value of , the short-run eect of the
education subsidy on economic growth remains inconclusive.
After period 6, the economy gradually converges to its new steady-state equi-
librium. During this transition process, the net growth rate of the number of firms
and the other market factors gradually approach zero. Therefore, in the steady-
state equilibrium, the net growth rate of GDP becomes equivalent to the net growth
rate of the average productivity of firms. Consistent with the results of (42), Fig-
ure 7-6 shows that the net growth rate of GDP in the new steady-state equilib-
rium becomes lower than that in the original steady-state equilibrium. Therefore,
irrespective of the value of , the long-run eect of the education subsidy on
economic growth is negative.
These numerical simulation results indicate that when the market structure
adjusts partially in the short run, the growth eect of the education subsidy is
ambiguous and depends upon the values of the parameters. However, when market
structure adjusts fully in the long run, the education subsidy expands the number
of firms but reduces economic growth.
5 Concluding Remarks
Employing a two-period overlapping generations model of R&D-based growth
with both product development and process innovation, this paper examined how
a subsidy policy for encouraging more individuals to receive higher education
aects the per capita GDP growth rate of the economy. We showed that when
the market structure adjusts partially in the short run, the eect of the education
subsidy on economic growth is ambiguous and depends on the values of the pa-
rameters. However, when the market structure adjusts fully in the long run, the
education subsidy expands the number of firms but reduces economic growth.
These unfavorable predictions of the education subsidy on economic growth are
partly consistent with empirical findings that mass higher education does not nec-
essarily lead to higher economic growth. A higher education subsidy policy is
perhaps inappropriate for the purpose of stimulating long-run economic growth.
To clarify our main arguments, we employ a simple, tractable growth model
with some restrictive specifications and ignore various important elements of higher
education, such as credit constraints due to family income inequality and uncer-
tainty of educational outcomes. Although these specifications enable us to obtain
an intuitive clear-cut prediction regarding the eect of the higher education sub-
23
sidy on R&D-based growth, some of them are overly restrictive from an empirical
perspective. Therefore, the application of our simple framework to assess the
likely impact of policy reform is obviously limited. Here, we note several limita-
tions of our specifications and briefly discuss directions for future research. First,
for analytical tractability, this paper assumes that the product development firms
inventing new varieties have to incur R&D expenditure one period in advance
of production, whereas intermediate goods firms can improve their eciency of
production through their in-house process innovation instantaneously. This asym-
metric specification of product development and process innovation improve the
tractability of the model greatly without altering the main predictions of this paper.
Nevertheless, it will be interesting to consider alternative specifications of R&D
activities. Second, since this paper uses a two-period OLG framework, if we em-
ploy a very straightforward interpretation, one period in our model is interpreted
as approximately 30 years. The concept of “short run” in our model does not
match the concept of “short run” in the real world, which makes the comparison of
our theoretical results with actual data slightly dicult. Therefore, to evaluate the
likely impact of a higher education subsidy on economic growth more precisely,
it is necessarily to develop a more elaborate numerical version of the large-scale
OLG model. Third, this paper only focuses on the growth implications of an edu-
cation subsidy policy and cannot propose a reasonable framework to analyze the
welfare and distributional implications of a higher education subsidy policy. The
investigation of these issues in a more elaborate version of a R&D-based growth
model that fully accounts for the important properties of higher education is a
promising direction for future research.
Appendix
Appendix A: Properties of H(!t; s) and L(!t; s)
Dierentiating H(!t; s) with respect to !t and s yields:
!tH!(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
=   !t
H(!t; s)
M!ˆt(!ˆt)
1   s
(1   s!t)2 < 0; (A.1)
sHs(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
=
s
H(!t; s)
M!ˆt(!ˆt)
!t(1   !t)
(1   s!t)2 > 0; (A.2)
where !ˆt = !ˆ(!t; s) and (!ˆt) is the value of the probability density function of
, (), evaluated at  = !ˆt. Analogously, dierentiating L(!t; s) with respect to
!t and s yields
!tL!(!t; s)
L(!t; s)
=
!t
L(!t; s)
M(!ˆt)
1   s
(1   s!t)2 > 0; (A.3)
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sLs(!t; s)
L(!t; s)
=   s
L(!t; s)
M(!ˆt)
!t(1   !t)
(1   s!t)2 < 0: (A.4)
Appendix B: Intermediate goods firms’ profit maximization
There are two steps in the intermediate goods firms’ profit maximization problem.
First, the intermediate goods firms conduct process innovation, and second, they
produce the intermediate goods. We solve the problems backward. In the second
step, we maximize an intermediate goods firm’s profit from the production given
its productivity and the R&D outlay. Then, we turn back to the first step and decide
how much the intermediate goods firms should invest in process innovation.
Second step
The jth intermediate goods firm’s profit maximization problem in the second step
can be written as follows:
ˆt( j)  max pt( j)xt( j)   wst lst ( j) + wut lut ( j)	 ;
subject to (9) and (10), where ˆt( j) is a profit function in this step of the problem,
given its productivity At( j). We first minimize the production costs of wst l
s
t ( j) +
wut l
u
t ( j) subject to (10), which yields the following unit cost function as well as
both skilled and unskilled labor demand functions of intermediate goods firm j:
ct( j) =
cˆt
At( j)
;
lst ( j) = 
cˆtxt( j)
wstAt( j)
; (A.5)
lut ( j) = (1   )
cˆtxt( j)
wut At( j)
; (A.6)
where cˆt  (w
s
t )
(wut )
(1 )
(1 )(1 ) . Thus, the jth intermediate goods firm’s profit maximiza-
tion problem in this step can be rewritten as follows:
ˆt( j)  max
(
[pt( j)   cˆtAt( j) ]xt( j)
)
;
subject to (9). The first-order condition yields the optimal price and output of firm
j given its productivity and prices and productivities of other firms as follows:
pt( j) =

   1
cˆt
At( j)
; (A.7)
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xt( j) =
   1

At( j)
cˆt
R nt
0
At( j) 1d j
PtYt: (A.8)
Substituting (A.7) and (A.8) into ˆt( j) yields the profit function as follows:
ˆt( j) =
1

At( j) 1R nt
0
At( j) 1d j
PtYt: (A.9)
First step
Then, turn back to the first step. The object of this step is to maximize the inter-
mediate goods firm’s net profits t( j) defined in (12). Using the results obtained
in the second step, the jth intermediate goods firm’s profit maximization problem
in the first step can be written as follows:
t( j)  max
n
ˆt( j)   wst lRt ( j)
o
;
subject to (11) and (A.9). The first-order condition with respect to lRt ( j) is:
(   1) ˆt( j)
lRt ( j)
= wst : (A.10)
Equation (A.10) implies that lRt ( j) is independent on j and so are At( j), pt( j) and
xt( j). Therefore, we can omit the index j, and thus, equations (A.7) to (A.9) are
rewritten as follows:
pt =

   1
cˆt
At
; (A.11)
xt =
   1

At
cˆt
PtYt
nt
; (A.12)
ˆt =
1

PtYt
nt
: (A.13)
By substituting (A.12) into (A.5) and (A.6) and rearranging them, we can obtain
the optimal level of skilled and unskilled labor inputs for intermediate goods pro-
duction as (13) and (14). Moreover, substituting (A.13) into (A.10) yields the
optimal level of skilled labor engaged in process innovation as (15).
Appendix C: The market-clearing condition for assets
Due to perfect competition in the final goods market, the value of final goods
output is expressed as follows:
Pc;tYt = ntptxt:
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Thus, using the profits of intermediate goods firms t = ptxt   wst lst   wut lut   wst lRt
and equations (20), (22) and (23), the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
Pc;tYt = wstH(!t; s) + w
u
t L(!t; s)   wst LNt + nt(Vt 1Rt   Vt):
Using (21), the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
Pc;tYt = (1 t)
Z 1
!ˆ(!t;s)

wst  + sw
u
t (1   )

Md()+(1 t)wut L(!t; s) wst LNt +nt(Vt 1Rt Vt):
Therefore, the market-clearing condition for final goods is expressed in the fol-
lowing manner:X
i=1;2
Z 1
0
Pc;tCi;tMd() = (1   t)
Z 1
!ˆ(!t;s)

wst  + sw
u
t (1   )

Md()
+ (1   t)wut L(!t; s)   wst LNt + nt(Vt 1Rt   Vt):
In the case of Vtt = wst , LNt > 0 and nt+1 > nt
With respect to (19), consider the case of Vtt = wst in which the product devel-
opment sector functions: LNt > 0; and nt+1 > nt. By substituting (2), (3), (5), (6),
(17) and Vtt = wst into the market-clearing condition for final goods, we obtain
the following expression:Z 1
0
S t Md()   Vtnt+1 = Rt
"Z 1
0
S t 1Md()   Vt 1nt
#
:
Because initial assets are given by
R 1
0
S  1Md() = V 1n0, we can obtain the
following asset market equilibrium condition:
Vtnt+1 =
Z 1
0
S t Md(); for Vtt = w
s
t :
In the case of Vtt < wst , LNt = 0 and nt+1 = nt
With respect to (19), consider the case of Vtt < wst in which the product develop-
ment sector does not function; LNt = 0 and nt+1 = nt. By substituting (2), (3), (5),
(6) and LNt = 0 into the market-clearing condition for final goods, we obtain the
following expression:Z 1
0
S t Md()   Vtnt = Rt
"Z 1
0
S t 1Md()   Vt 1nt
#
:
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Because the initial assets are given by
R 1
0
S  1Md() = V 1n0, we obtain the
following asset market equilibrium condition:
Vtnt =
Z 1
0
S t Md(); for Vtt < w
s
t :
Appendix D: Properties of !(nt; s) and !(s)
Derivations of (27)
Using (13), (15) and (22), we obtain the following equation:
H(!t; s)   LNt = nt(lst + lRt ) = ( + )
   1

PtYt
wst
: (A.14)
Furthermore, substituting (14) into (23), we obtain the following equation:
L(!t; s) = (1   )   1

PtYt
wut
: (A.15)
Using (A.14) and (A.15), LNt can be expressed as (27).
Properties of !(nt; s)
From (28), by dierentiating!t with respect to nt and s, with noting

nt
t
+ 11+H(!t; s)

1
!t
=

1+ +
+
1 

L(!t; s), we obtain:
nt!n(nt; s)
!(nt; s)
=
(1    ) nt
t
nt
t

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

+
H(!t;s)
1+

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)   !tH!(!t;s)H(!t;s)
 > 0; (A.16)
s!s(nt; s)
!(nt; s)
=  

nt
t
+
H(!t;s)
1+

sLs(!t;s)
L(!t;s)
  H(!t;s)1+ sHs(!t;s)H(!t;s)
nt
t

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

+
H(!t;s)
1+

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)   !tH!(!t;s)H(!t;s)
 > 0; (A.17)
where !t = !(nt; s).
Properties of !(s)
From (29), the dierentiation of  (!t; s) with respect to !t and s yields:
!t !(!t; s)
 (!t; s)
= 1 +
!tL!(!t; s)
L(!t; s)
  !tH!(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
> 0; (A.18)
s s(!t; s)
 (!t; s)
=
sLs(!t; s)
L(!t; s)
  sHs(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
< 0: (A.19)
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Hence, by dierentiating !(s) with respect to s, we obtain:
s!s(s)
!(s)
=  
sLs(!;s)
L(!;s)   sHs(!
;s)
H(!;s)
1 + !
L!(!;s)
L(!;s)   !
H!(!;s)
H(!;s)
> 0; (A.20)
where ! = !(s).
Appendix E: Properties of Hˆ(nt; s) and Hˆ(s)
Properties of Hˆ(nt; s)
From (32), dierentiating Hˆ(nt; s) with respect to nt yields:
ntHˆn(nt; s)
Hˆ(nt; s)
=
!tH!(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
nt!n(nt; s)
!(nt; s)
< 0; (A.21)
where !t = !(nt; s). Note that the relations
!tH!(!t;s)
H(!t;s)
< 0 and nt!n(nt;s)
!(nt;s)
> 0 hold
from (A.1) and (A.16).
Analogously, from (32), dierentiating Hˆ(nt; s) with respect to s yields:
sHˆs(nt; s)
Hˆ(nt; s)
=
!tH!(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
s!s(nt; s)
!(nt; s)
+
sHs(!t; s)
H(!t; s)
;
where !t = !(nt; s). Then, by substituting (A.17) into above equation and rear-
ranging it, we obtain:
sHˆs(nt; s)
Hˆ(nt; s)
=

nt
t
+
H(!t;s)
1+
 h
1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

sHs(!t;s)
H(!t;s)
  !tH!(!t;s)H(!t;s) sLs(!t;s)L(!t;s)
i
nt
t

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

+
H(!t;s)
1+

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)   !tH!(!t;s)H(!t;s)
 ;
where !t = !(nt; s). From equations (A.1) to (A.4), we can see that the relations
!tL!(!t;s)
L(!t;s)
=  !tH!(!t;s)L(!t;s)!ˆt and sLs(!t;s)L(!t;s) =   sHs(!t;s)L(!t;s)!ˆt hold, where !ˆt = !(!t; s). Thus, by
substituting these relations into the above equation, we obtain:
sHˆs(nt; s)
Hˆ(nt; s)
=
( nt
t
+
H(!t;s)
1+ )
sHs(!t;s)
H(!t;s)
nt
t

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

+
H(!t;s)
1+

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)   !tH!(!t;s)H(!t;s)
 > 0; (A.22)
where !t = !(nt; s).
Properties of Hˆ(s)
From (32), dierentiating Hˆ(s) with respect to s yields:
sHˆ(s)
Hˆ(s)
=
!H!(!; s)
H(!; s)
s!s(s)
!
+
sHs(!; s)
H(!; s)
;
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where ! = !(s). Then, by substituting (A.20) into the above equation and
rearranging it, we obtain:
sHˆ(s)
Hˆ(s)
=

1 + !
L!(!;s)
L(!;s)

sHs(!)
H(!;s)   !
H!(!;s)
H(!;s)
sLs(!;s)
L(!;s)
1 + !
L!(!;s)
L(!;s)   !
H!(!;s)
H(!;s)
;
where ! = !(s). From equations (A.1) to (A.4), we can see that the relations
!L!(!;s)
L(!;s) =  !
H!(!;s)
L(!;s)!ˆ and
sLs(!;s)
L(!;s) =   sHs(!
;s)
L(!;s)!ˆ hold, where !ˆ  !ˆ(!; s). Thus, by
substituting these relations into above equation, we obtain:
sHˆ(s)
Hˆ(s)
=
sHs(!;s)
H(!;s)
1 + !
L!(!;s)
L(!;s)   !
H!(!;s)
H(!;s)
> 0; (A.23)
where ! = !(s).
Appendix F: Properties of Gn(nt; s)
Properties of  ˆ(nt; s)
From (35), dierentiating  ˆ(nt; s) with respect to nt yields:
nt ˆn(nt; s)
 ˆ(nt; s)
=
!t !(!t; s)
 (!t; s)
nt!n(nt; s)
!(nt; s)
> 0; (A.24)
where !t = !(nt; s). Note that the relations
!t !(!t;s)
 (!t;s)
> 0 and nt!n(nt;s)
!t
> 0 hold
from (A.16) and (A.18). Further, by substituting (A.16) and (A.18) into (A.24),
with noting nt
t
= H(!t; s)[(

1+ +
+
1  ) (!t; s)   11+ ] from (28), we obtain:
nt ˆn(nt; s)
 ˆ(nt; s)
=
1    
1+!t L!(!t ;s)L(!t ;s)
1+!t L!(!t ;s)L(!t ;s)  
!tH!(!t ;s)
H(!t ;s)
+ 11+
1

1++
+
1 

 (!t;s)  11+
; (A.25)
where !t = !(nt; s). Similarly, from (35), dierentiating  ˆ(nt; s) with respect to s
yields:
s ˆs(nt; s)
 ˆ(nt; s)
=
!t !(!t; s)
 (!t; s)
s!s(nt; s)
!(nt; s)
+
s s(!t; s)
 (!t; s)
;
where !t = !(nt; s). Then, by substituting equations (A.17) to (A.19) into the
above equation and rearranging it, we obtain:
s ˆs(nt; s)
 ˆ(nt; s)
=
nt
t
h
!tH!(!t;s)
H(!t;s)
sLs(!t;s)
L(!t;s)
 

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

sHs(!t;s)
H(!t;s)
i
nt
t

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

+
H(!t;s)
1+

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)   !tH!(!t;s)H(!t;s)
 ;
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where !t = !(nt; s). From equations (A.1) to (A.4), we can see that the relations
!tL!(!t;s)
L(!t;s)
=  !tH!(!t;s)L(!t;s)!ˆt and sLs(!t;s)L(!t;s) =   sHs(!t;s)L(!t;s)!ˆt hold, where !ˆt = !(!t; s). Thus, by
substituting these relations into the above equation, we obtain:
s ˆs(nt; s)
 ˆ(nt; s)
=  
nt
t
sHs(!t;s)
H(!t;s)
nt
t

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)

+
H(!t;s)
1+

1 + !tL!(!t;s)L(!t;s)   !tH!(!t;s)H(!t;s)
 < 0; (A.26)
where !t = !(nt; s).
The relationship between F

 ˆ(nt; s)

and  ˆ(nt; s)
From (35), the dierentiation of F

 ˆ(nt; s)

with respect to  ˆ(nt; s) yields:
 ˆ(nt; s)F ˆ

 ˆ(nt; s)

F

 ˆ(nt; s)
 = 1+ 1+1   ˆ(nt;s)(1+ ˆ(nt;s))2
F

 ˆ(nt; s)
 > 0: (A.27)
Properties of Gn(nt; s)
From (35), dierentiating Gn(nt; s) with respect to nt yields:
ntGnn(nt; s)
Gn(nt; s)
=  
 ˆ(nt; s)F ˆ

 ˆ(nt; s)

F

 ˆ(nt; s)
 nt ˆn(nt; s)
 ˆ(nt; s)
< 0; (A.28)
where the relations  ˆ(nt;s)F ˆ( ˆ(nt;s))
F( ˆ(nt;s)) > 0 and
nt ˆn(nt;s)
 ˆ(nt;s)
> 0 hold from (A.24) and
(A.27).
Analogously, from (35), dierentiating Gn(nt; s) with respect to s yields:
sGns(nt; s)
Gn(nt; s)
=  
 ˆ(nt; s)F ˆ

 ˆ(nt; s)

F

 ˆ(nt; s)
 s ˆs(nt; s)
 ˆ(nt; s)
> 0; (A.29)
where the relations  ˆ(nt;s)F ˆ( ˆ(nt;s))
F( ˆ(nt;s)) > 0 and
s ˆs(nt;s)
 ˆ(nt;s)
< 0 hold from (A.26) and (A.27).
Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 1
The steady state values
n
n;GA
o
When the product development sector does not operate (i.e., nt+1 = nt), from
(29), we can see that the relation !L(!; s) = 1 
+
H(!; s) holds. Therefore,
substituting !L(!; s) = 1 
+
H(!; s) and ! = !(s) into (28) yields the steady-
state number of firms as (37). Moreover, substituting (32) and (37) into (33) yields
the steady-state gross growth rate of the average productivity of firms as (38).
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Local stability
By dierentiating Gn(nt; s)nt with respect to nt and evaluating it at nt = n, we
obtain:
dnt+1
dnt
jnt=n= 1 +
nGnn(n
; s)
Gn(n; s)
jnt=n ;
where the relation Gn(n; s) = 1 holds. Therefore, by substituting (A.25), (A.27)
and (A.28) into the above equation and evaluating it at nt = n with noting
 ˆ(n; s) = !
L(!;s)
H(!;s) =
1 
+
, and  (!; s) = 1, we obtain:
dnt+1
dnt
jnt=n= 1   (1 + )(1    )
 + 
 +  + (1 + )
1+!
L!(!;s)
L(!;s)
1+!
L!(!;s)
(!;s)L  !
H!(!;s)
H(!;s)
; (A.30)
where ! = !(s). From (A.30), suppose that the parameter conditions of (36)
hold; then, we can confirm that the relation dnt+1dnt jnt=n2 [0; 1) holds.
Appendix H: Properties of GDPt
Derivations of (40)
From (A.15), we obtain:
Yt =

(1   )(   1)
wst
Pt
!tL(!t; s): (A.31)
Further, substituting (A.11) into Pt = n
1
 1 
t
R nt
0
pt( j)1 d j
1=(1 )
yields:
wst
Pt
=
   1

(1   )1  Atn

t
!t1 
: (A.32)
Using (A.31) and (A.32), we obtain:
Yt =
1
1   
!tL(!t; s)
!1 t
(1   )1 Atnt : (A.33)
Furthermore, substituting (17), (19) (A.14) and Pc;t = Pt into VtPc;t (nt+1   nt) yields:
Vt
Pc;t
(nt+1   nt) = w
s
t
Pt
H(!t; s)   ( + )   1

Yt: (A.34)
Therefore, by substituting equations (A.32) to (A.34) into the definition of GDP
in (39), we obtain:
GDPt =
26666664   1 H(!t; s)!1 t +
1   ( + )  1

1   
!tL(!t; s)
!1 t
37777775(1   )1 Atnt : (A.35)
Note that substituting (30) into (A.33) and (A.35) yields (40).
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Properties of (s)
In the steady-state equilibrium, from (29), the following relation holds:
!(s)Lˆ(s) = Hˆ(s)
1   
 + 
:
Thus, (s) in (40) can be rewritten as follows:
(s) =
1
 + 
Hˆ(s)
!(s)1 
:
By dierentiating the above equation with respect to s, we obtain:
ss(s)
(s)
=
sHˆs (s)
Hˆ(s)
  (1   ) s!

s(s)
!(s)
:
Substituting (A.20) and (A.23) into the above equation yields:
ss(s)
(s)
=
(1   ) sLs(!;s)L(!;s) +  sHs(!
;s)
H(!;s)
1 + !
L!(!;s)
L(!;s)   !
H!(!;s)
H(!;s)
;
where ! = !(s). From equations (A.2) and (A.4), we can see that the relation
sLs(!;s)
L(!;s) =   sHs(!
;s)
L(!;s)!ˆ holds, where !ˆ  !ˆ(!; s). Thus, by substituting (29) and
sLs(!;s)
L =   sHs(!
;s)
L!ˆ into the above equation, we obtain:
ss(s)
(s)
=
h
 ( + )!
!ˆ
+ 
i
sHs(!;s)
H
1 + !
L!(!;s)
L   !
H!(!;s)
H
< 0;
where ! = !(s), and the relation !

!ˆ
= 1 s!

1 s > 1 holds from (1).
Appendix I: The parameters for simulation
We set the discount factor () to (0:98)30, since the one period in this model is
assumed to be approximately 30 years. According to Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth
(2005), markup estimates in the US industry range between 1.05 and 1.40. Based
on this estimate, the substitution parameter () is set to 6. We also set the degree of
specialization parameter () to 1=( 1) to match the Dixit-Stiglitz-type specifica-
tion. Further, to satisfy the second-order condition for maximization (  1) < 1,
we set the in-house R&D eciency parameter () to 0.15.
According to the OECD (2015), the average skill premium for the OECD
measured as the relative wages of those with a university degree relative to a high
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school education is approximately 1.5. Based on this estimate, the elasticity of
skilled labor inputs () is set to 0.3. In addition, in accordance with the example
of Strulik et al. (2013), we set the standing-on-shoulders eect parameter ( ) to
0.35 and normalize the scaling parameter of R&D production (¯) to 1.
The population size (M) and the initial value of average productivity of firms
(A0) are normalized to 1, whereas the initial value of the number of firms (n0) is
set to 0:1 to ensure that the relation !0 = !n(n0; s) < ! holds.
To achieve an approximately 2.5% balanced GDP growth rate at an education
subsidy rate (s) of 0, we adjust the value of z to z = 2:177. In addition, to inves-
tigate the eect of the education subsidy policy, we set the education subsidy rate
(s) to 0 in the base case simulation and changed it from 0 to 0.9 in increments of
0.1.
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Figure 2: The relationship between the number of firms and the relative wage of
unskilled/skilled workers (s < s0)
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Figure 3: The relationship between the number of firms and the gross growth rate
of the average productivity of firms (s < s0)
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Figure 4: The relationship between the number of firms and the gross growth rate
of the number of firms (s < s0)
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Figure 5: The possible dynamics of nt when the parameter conditions of (36) are
satisfied (s < s0)
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Figure 6: The possible dynamics of nt when the parameter conditions of (36) are
not satisfied
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Figure 7: The eects of a rise in education subsidy rate s
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Figure 7: The eects of a rise in education subsidy rate s (Cont.)
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